Extraneous estimates, Game Theory

Extraneous Estimates

If some parameters are identified, while others are not and there exists information on their value from other (extraneous) sources, the researcher may proceed with the estimation of the identified coefficients and use the extraneously known value for the non-identified ones.

Of the above identifjling restrictions the most important and most widely used are the restrictions on the values of the structural parameters.

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