Evolutionary game theory, Game Theory

 

 

Evolutionary game theory provides a dynamic framework for analyzing repeated interaction. Originally modeled when "natural models" of fitness, a population might contains folks genetically "programmed" to play an exact strategy, and who reproduce proportionally to their payoffs. Hence, methods that do poorly eventually die off, whereas well-performing methods thrive. These replicator dynamics, modeled by equal probabilities of any 2 players meeting in a very given amount, are extended to spatial models, during which colonies, or native conventions, may emerge.

 

Posted Date: 7/21/2012 3:55:02 AM | Location : United States







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