Dominant strategy equilibrium, Game Theory

The following is a payoff matrix for a non-cooperative simultaneous move game between 2 players.

The payoffs are in the order (Player 1; Player 2):

What is the Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE) and associated payoffs?


468_Dominant Strategy Equilibrium.png

Type your answer in the following form:

(b;B) ; (9; 8)

If you think the outcome is (b;B) with pay-offs (9; 8) ; but remember the brackets, commas, upper/lower case letters, AND no spaces.

Posted Date: 3/9/2013 5:30:56 AM | Location : United States

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