Determine the nash equilibrium, Microeconomics

              Player 2

 

C

B

A

1,2

3,2

B

2,3

a, b

 

      Player 1

 

 

 

a. If B is a dominant strategy for Player 1, what do we know about a?

b. If C dominates D for Player 2, what do we know about b?

c. If (B,D) is a Nash equilibrium, what must be true about a and b?

d. What values, if any, make (A,C) a Nash equilibrium?

Posted Date: 3/6/2013 3:02:04 AM | Location : United States







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