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Consider the electoral competition game presented in Lecture 6. In this game there are two candidates who simultaneously choose policies from the real line. There is a distribution of voters with median m and the candidate whose policy is closest to the median wins the election and the winning candidate's policy is implemented. If the two candidates are an equal distance from the median, then the average of the two policies is implemented. For this problem we suppose that both candidates care about both the implemented policy and winning the election. That is, the payo to each candidate has two parts. The first part is the utility from the implemented policy a*. That is, each candidate has utility u(a* ; xi), where xi is the ideal policy of candidate i and utility decreases to the left and right of xi. We suppose that xi < m < xj . The second part is the value of winning office, which we denote wi > 0 for candidate i. Putting these two parts together, we de ne the payoff to candidate i by
Find all Nash equilibria to this game.
Matches or different objects are organized in 2 or a lot of piles. Players alternate removing some or all of the matches from anyone pile. The player to get rid of the last match w
Rollback shows that Boeing chooses peace over war if Airbus enters, so Airbus will enter. Rollback equilibrium entails Airbus playing “Enter” and Boeing playing “Peace if entry”; e
Consider a game in which player 1 chooses rows, player 2 chooses columns and player 3 chooses matrices. Only Player 3''s payoffs are given below. Show that D is not a best response
Exercise 1 a) Pure strategy nash equilibrium in this case is Not Buy, bad ( 0,0) as no one wants to deviate from this strategy. b) The player chooses buy in the first perio
The strategic (or normal) kind may be a matrix illustration of a simultaneous game. for 2 players, one is that the "row" player, and also the different, the "column" player. every
Scenario To determine who is needed to try to to the nightly chores, 2 youngsters simultaneously build one among 3 symbols with their fists - a rock, paper, or scissors. straigh
Perfect Nash equilibrium Two students prepare their homework assignment together for a course. They both enjoy getting high grade for their assignment, but they dislike workin
Scenario The French thinker, Jean Jacques Rousseau, presented the subsequent state of affairs. 2 hunters will either jointly hunt a stag (an adult deer and rather massive meal)
A game tree (also referred to as the in depth form) may be a graphical illustration of a sequential game. It provides data concerning the players, payoffs, strategies, and also the
What is the Iterated Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (IDSE) and associated pay-offs? Type your answer in the following form: (c,B) , (6, 4) if you think the outcome is
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