Determine nash equilibria, Game Theory

Consider the electoral competition game presented in Lecture 6. In this game there are two candidates who simultaneously choose policies from the real line. There is a distribution of voters with median m and the candidate whose policy is closest to the median wins the election and the winning candidate's policy is implemented. If the two candidates are an equal distance from the median, then the average of the two policies is implemented. For this problem we suppose that both candidates care about both the implemented policy and winning the election. That is, the payo to each candidate has two parts. The first part is the utility from the implemented policy a*. That is, each candidate has utility u(a* ; xi), where xi is the ideal policy of candidate i and utility decreases to the left and right of xi. We suppose that xi < m < xj . The second part is the value of winning office, which we denote wi > 0 for candidate i. Putting these two parts together, we de ne the payoff to candidate i by

1068_Find all Nash equilibria.png

Find all Nash equilibria to this game.

Posted Date: 2/20/2013 2:04:43 AM | Location : United States







Related Discussions:- Determine nash equilibria, Assignment Help, Ask Question on Determine nash equilibria, Get Answer, Expert's Help, Determine nash equilibria Discussions

Write discussion on Determine nash equilibria
Your posts are moderated
Related Questions
A pure strategy defines a selected move or action that a player can follow in each potential attainable state of affairs in a very game. Such moves might not be random, or drawn fr

Two animals are fighting over a prey. The prey is worth v to each animal. The cost of fighting is c1 for the first animal (player 1) and c2 for the second animal (player 2). If the

saaaaaaasfffffffffffffffffffaaaczzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

1. This question and the next is based on the following description. Consider the coalitional game (referred to as Game 1) given by: N = {1,2,3,4}; v(N) = 3, v{i} = 0, i = 1,...,4,

In Bontemps, Louisiana there are only two places to spend time: Merlotte's bar and Fangtasia. Sookie and Eric have made plans to spend Friday night together, but they never decided

A strategy is strictly dominant if, no matter what the other players do, the strategy earns a player a strictly higher payoff than the other. Hence, a method is strictly dominant i

Scenario To determine who is needed to try to to the nightly chores, 2 youngsters simultaneously build one among 3 symbols with their fists - a rock, paper, or scissors. straigh

Consider the electoral competition game presented in Lecture 6. In this game there are two candidates who simultaneously choose policies from the real line. There is a distribution

You and an opponent are seated at a table, and on the table is a square board. At each of the four corners of the board, there is a disc, each one red on one side and black on the

GAME 1 Claim a Pile of Dimes Two players Aand B are chosen. The instructor places a dime on the table. Player A can say Stop or Pass. If Stop, then A gets the dime and the gam