Borel, emile , Game Theory

 

Borel was maybe the primary to outline the notion of games of strategy. He printed many papers on poker, incorporating themes of imperfect data and credibility. Whereas his writings on game theory were rather sparse, his contributions to live theory and chance were quite substantial. Combining these 2 interests, Borel urged the existence of mixed methods, or chance distributions over one's actions that will result in stable play.

 

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