airline ticket, Game Theory

why might an airline offer the following deal: you pay 400 for a round trip ticket from here to orlando, but you only pay 300 per ticket if you stayy in orlando includes a saturday night? (separating equilibrium) what if the airline offered the 300 ticket for a Tuesday night stay, would it be as effective? (pooling equilibrium)
Posted Date: 11/21/2012 1:30:15 AM | Location : United States







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