non-credible threat , Game Theory

 

A non-credible threat may be a threat created by a player in a very Sequential Game which might not be within the best interest for the player to hold out. The hope is that the threat is believed during which case there's no have to be compelled to carry it out. Whereas Nash equilibria might rely on non-credible threats, Backward Induction eliminates them.

 

Posted Date: 7/21/2012 4:37:46 AM | Location : United States







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