Assume you own the stadium and variable cost per attendant
Course:- Business Economics
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Your the manager for a college football team. Assume you own the stadium and the variable cost per attendant is $0. You’ve been told by your in-house economist that you should set the price of tickets at $50 to maximize profit. Your football coach is really pushing to sell out the game. If $50 is the profit maximizing price, will you sell out the game? Why or why not?. can you help me with this. can you explain whether or not i sell out the game and why

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